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nder this rather forbidding title I 
want to dig below the immediately 
practical questions to do with 
selection and streaming in schools 
and look at certain of the funda-
mental moral and socip.l value questions that 
pervade debates on these topics. In doing this I am 
not seeking to evade the directly practical issues 
that arise. It is rather that, in an area where much of 
the empirical evidence on what happens under 
different practical arrangements is inconclusive 
and raises such sharp controversy, there is a 
danger that we lose sight of what is really at stake. 
The analytical exercise of the kind I shall undertake 
therefore seeks to bring to the fore just those basic 
issues of principle on which any organisation of 
schooling inevitably takes some stand. After all 
what we really want is a system that as far as 
possible embodies the principles we really espouse 
rather than one locked into principles we have 
inadequately examined. The basic question I am 
therefore addressing is: what are the principles of 
selection and streaming we think the educational 
system should reflect and what can we say about 
the practical organisation of the system simply on 
these grounds. 
As a first move in this analytical task let me 
make it plain how I understand the terms 
"selection" and "streaming" within the context that 
concerns us. The process of selection I shall take to 
be the grouping of pupils according to certain 
particular rules as part of the means to achieving 
certain educational ends or purposes. Selection 
within an educational system is thus a deliberate, 
intentional procedure which is built into the system 
and it is primarily justified as the means to certain 
ends. If that is the case, we shall avoid a good deal 
of confusion in our debates if we keep a firm hold on 
what the educational purposes are that we wish 
schools to serve and see the rules of any selection 
processes in relation to these. If the purposes are 
clear we can at least seek to assess what selection 
processes, if any, are consistent with those ends 
even if it is difficult to discover empirically the detail 
of what happens when we put certain processes 
into practice. Of course this is not to deny that any 
system of selection will have consequences that 
were not envisaged. And that being so we must 
always be prepared to change the system in the 
light of what actually happens. But it is with the 
educational purposes of schools that we must 
surely start if we are to examine issues of selection 
coherently. 
But within any sizeable educational system the 
process of selection can be carried out at two 
different levels. First, at the level of the organisation 
of schools as a whole, there is the selection of pupils 
for admission to different schools. Here the central 
question is whether there are to be schools of 
different types, schools that serve different 
purposes. Are we in fact to have a selective system 
at all? If so, what distinct purposes are different 
schools to serve and what are to be the rules by 
which pupils are selected for them?lt is these issues 
about schools within the system that are usually 
referred to as the problem of "selection". But the 
process of selection also arises within any one 
school no matter what its basis for admitting pupils 
is. The issue now is how pupils are to be grouped 
into classes or other units for actually achieving 
what the school is after. Are there to be different 
kinds of classes, e.g. different streams, sets, or 
mixed ability groups and if so what are to be the 
rules for putting pupils into them? At this level it is 
customary to refer to these interlocked questions 
as the issue of "streaming" though that is a 
shorthand when streaming is only one system of 
grouping. In these terms then there are two levels 
of questions I must address: those to do with 
"selection" and those to do with "streaming". 
But where is one to start on such large scale 
issues? What I have said already gives us the key I 
think. It is with the purposes we want schools to 
serve that we must begin. What is it we want 
achieved that leads us to advocate grammar or 
comprehensive schools, academic sets or mixed 
ability groups? At first the answer might seem very 
simple, we just want the best education for every 
child and all we need to know is how we should 
organise schools so that they get it. But as soon as 
we push matters a little further we discover that 
people are often radically divided as to what in 
practice that best education should be for any one 
pupil let alone what it should be for different pupils 
who vary widely in their abilities and interests. But 
if any argument for or against "selection" or 
"streaming" makes sense only in relation to the 
purposes of schools then we shall not get very far 
until we begin to sort ut what those purposes are to 
be. What I therefore wish to do is to distinguish the 
four major purposes that figure in most educational 
systems and lie behind debates on these issues, 
then going on to pursue the implications each of 
these has for "selection" and "streaming". What I 
shall argue is that in so far as we are committed to 
education in all these terms we have to recognise 
that we support moral and social principles that 
pull us in different directions. There is nothing 
unique in that dilemma, but it does mean that in 
seeking to reconcile our educational purposes we 
are compelled to consider what we judge most 
important for young people in our society. 
"Selection" and indeed "streaming" in schools are 
in the end both "political" issues though at very 
different levels. What then matters is that those 
"political" decisions are properly and responsibly 
taken. What I. personally consider should be the 
outcome for schools in the U.K. context I will I trust 
make plain. What you, in your context should 
conclude I am not really in a position to argue. 
What I hope I shall have done is set out the central 
ethical considerations that you must face. 
The first of the four purposes schools serve is, 
I suggest, the mastery of those areas of knowledge, 
understanding and skill that every person needs for 
basic competence and viability as an individual 
in their society. What I mean here is an education 
to which everyone in a society has a right simply as 
a human being in that society irrespective of race, 
religion, sex, social background or ability. It is the 
kind of education we recognise most readily at the 
primary stage where we consider everyone needs 
to read and write, to use numbers, to understand 
the world and the society about them. The idea that 
because some pupils find certain of these kinds of 
learning difficult or not interesting they should be 
selected to go to a school which attends to them 
selectively or to other things instead, would seem 
to most of us bizarre. These matters are so impor-
tant and so fundamental in everyone's life if it is 
to be a truly human life, that difficulty with these 
areas of learning demands that we provide special 
"remedial" help, extra teaching and attention. We 
do all we can so that no one misses out, if at all 
possible, in reaching that mtmmum level we 
consider everyone really must have. Here is a form 
of basic personal education that is for all, equally, 
where what we are after is set by the demands 
made on everyone by life in the society, not by the 
differences of any kind there might be between 
people or their roles. Not that all pupils will in fact 
attain even the minimum standards we think 
necessary for all and manifestly some pupils will 
rampage with great speed through all those things 
we would consider basic. But what matters in this 
form of education is that we do all we can to make 
sure everyone attains certain common ends. 
Education of this kind most of us would consider 
crucial for all as basic to development as a person 
as well as being necessary for purely practical 
reasons. In a democracy it must surely also be 
valued as a fundamental form of the educational 
.opportunity to which ali should equally have access 
as a basic right. What is to be noted however is that 
what exactly such a basic personal education 
should contain is not easily decided. In terms of 
elementary skills it is arguable that we are moving 
into a period when certain computer skills will be as 
necessary as writing skills.lt seems to me too that a 
basic understanding of the workings of one's 
society in terms of its financial, legal and political 
practices and its health and social services, is no 
longer an optional matter. Indeed, I would suggest 
that in western societies a great deal of education at 
the secondary stage ought now to be devoted to 
basic personal education that is necessary for all. 
Just what we consider to be the content and 
standards of the basic personal education we want 
attained by all is a very telling judgment for it marks 
out just what kind of life we think all, without 
exception, should have access to. 
But there is more to basic education than this. 
In addition to much necessary knowledge and skill, 
life in any society demands that we learn to 
establish certain kinds of relationships with- other 
people for without these much of what life is about 
is closed to us. Most of the things that we value in 
life of their very nature go on within complex 
personal and social relationships that are part of a 
vast network. It is in the family, in friendships, in 
associations for music making or playing games, in 
churches, businesses and hospitals that human life 
is lived. Learning to cooperate with others in 
enterprises of great variety and to establish certain 
kinds of relationship is thus a basic part of 
education to which all have a right simply as human 
beings in that society. In a liberal democratic 
society this includes learning to live together as 
equals, to treat people fairly, to respect the 
interests and freedom of others, to work together 
for the good of others, to accept responsibilities 
and share in benefits irrespective of sex, colour, 
creed, ability or social class. It includes too, 
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learning to take part in the political life of the 
society as a citizen with both a right to the benefits 
there are for all and responsibility to contribute to 
the good of the community. 
It seems to me therefore important that 
alongside the first form of education I outlined, that 
of basic personal education, we should distinguish 
a second form whose purpose is basic social 
education. Like the first we can recognise this kind 
of education for all at the primary school stage 
when learning to cooperate with other children no 
matter who, to share facilities and opportunities 
fairly with them and to consider their interests as 
well as one's own is built into the programme of 
activities. But it is now strongly argued, and I think 
rightly, that wide ranging personal and social 
education of many kinds is a necessity for all at the 
secondary stage for the good of pupils individually 
and for the good of society as a whole. No longer 
can we consider moral and political concerns as 
matters outside the educational sphere of 
responsible schooling if only because we demand 
significant choice in these areas by all members of 
our society irrespective to their. background. 
The third educational purpose I want to 
distinguish is of a sharply different character. 
Beyond pupils' basic development personally and 
socially, we see schools as providing opportunities 
for the fullest possible fulfilment of each individual's 
own distinctive abilities and talents. We recognise 
that, whatever the reason, people differ in their 
potentialities, some being better at languages, 
mathematics, music or games than others. People: 
are unique, they do not start alike and we do not 
wish to make them alike. Rather we consider it 
important that they be able to pursue the develop-
ment of their gifts and abilities and thereby find 
personal achievement and satisfaction. But the 
development of personal abilities is important not 
only for the good of the individual concerned. It is 
also of great importance for the community as a 
whole. The calibre of life we can all have depends 
very much on the use the society makes of the 
abilities and talents people have to contribute for 
the good of all. We need those who can to 
contribute to technological and industrial develop-
ment, to commercial enterprise and to medical and 
social services. Any society must therefore have a 
vested interest in developing pupils' abilities of 
great variety, for we need for the greater good of 
the community gardeners and plumbers, teachers 
and secretaries, scientists and surgeons. The 
development of pupils' particular abilities is 
therefore for both individual and social good. Not 
that all particular usl?.s of abilities are good or 
desirable, some can be individually or socially 
destructive. But we manifestly want schools to 
provide a wide range of opportunities for abilities to 
be developed in those ways that in themselves 
enhance the quality of life of the individual and 
contribute to the wider good of the community. It is 
of the nature of this form of education that, being 
geared to individual abilities, it will lead to 
differences of achievement in any one area and will 
concentrate on different abilities for different 
pupils. Indeed, its stress is on human difference and 
diversity, unlike the forms of basic education I 
outlined which are concerned with human 
similarities and likenesses. But for all their 
differences in a democratic society all pupils will 
have an equal right to opportunities for the 
development of their abilities within a framework 
designed to provide for both individual fulfilment 
and social good. Freedom to be different is the 
equal right of all and schools must do justice to both 
freedom and equality if they are to be ·truly 
democractic. 
In different societies and at different times, 
however, the value placed on particular abilities will 
vary and the opportunities provided overall for 
developing them will therefore be different. Though 
many people may be capable of being dentists, and 
indeed may wish to train in dentistry, the need for 
dentists may in fact at any one time be strictly 
limited so that only a sm?tll number of people could 
find personal satisfaction in that particular 
contribution to society's good. No real good will, 
then, can be served by offering an excess of places 
for training in dentistry. Open opportunity and 
competition in terms of ability for the appropriate 
number of places is clearly the most rational 
approach. The provision of opportunities for 
training in different areas clearly serves to channel 
human abilities so that they can find fulfilment in 
valued ways. 
But societies have other ways of steering the 
development of abilities, in particular by giving 
rewards of money, status or power to those with 
skills and qualities that are prized. This being so, in 
educating for the development of personal abilities, 
schools come to serve other, very different, 
purposes. The development of high ability, as say a 
mathematician or lawyer, can come to be valued 
not for the personal fulfilment that ability can bring 
in itself nor for the good it can bring to the 
community, but because it is the means to the 
individual achieving valued extrinsic rewards. in 
terms of money for cars, houses and travel or 
influence in political or social circles. Schools then 
serve a fourth purpose, access to rewards. Of 
course schools may well serve the development of 
abilities for their intrinsic value to pupils and society 
and at the same time incidentally serve this fourth 
purpose by putting many of their pupils into the 
way of high rewards. But if what matters is the 
development of abilities for personal and social 
good, many abilities that have low extrinsic 
rewards may well be seen as being of high 
importance. If on the other hand the rewards are 
what matters, then education in this fourth sense 
can seek to develop abilities that may bring little or 
no significant fulfilment to the pupil and indeed 
might belong to a category that does little or no 
social good. Developing abilities can thus take on 
two different purposes which may in fact conflict 
for any individual. What is in a pupils' personal 
interests ·may produce little by way of rewards or 
rewards may come from pursuits that give little 
personal satisfaction. That particular kinds of 
abilities are tied to high rewards means that 
whether we like it or not certain educational 
decisions are tightly linked to external social 
consequences of very considerable significance for 
pupils. Their future standard of living is likely to be 
determined to a large degree by the abilities they do 
or do not develop at school. That being so, if we 
subscribe to liberal democratic principles we shall 
want an educational system which takes seriously 
equality of opportunity for pupils to seek those 
rewards. 
I have distinguished four purposes which 
education serves because in pursuing each of these 
the issues of "selection" and "streaming" take on a 
different significance and only if we keep all four 
purposes in mind can we begin to adequately 
determine what we should do. The first of the 
purposes, that of basic personal education, is 
concerned with a common set of achievements for 
all. It is not about differences between pupils 
except in so far as some have difficulty in mastering 
the basic knowledge and skills that all require as 
common goods to which all have equal right. 
Schools therefore must attend to pupils' 
disadvantages and seek to overcome these 
whatever their cause. But if the concern is with all 
attaining common basic levels in the same areas of 
education, there can be no different purpose for 
different schools or even for different classes other 
than those arising from learning difficulties. A 
selective system of schools, except for extreme 
handicap, would seem to lack any rationale in 
terms of this first purpose. And selective classes 
within a school could have nothing to do with 
pursuing different goals or different standards. The 
best means for reaching common goals could be 
the only basis for selection. 
The second purpose, that of basic social 
education, introduces another consideration. For if 
such education is concerned precisely with 
learning to live and cooperate with others, 
respecting them equally irrespective of their ability, 
race, religion, sex or social class, then any principle 
of selection is likely to strike at the very roots of 
that purpose. A school system which is selective on 
any grounds is thereby deficient in its provision of 
schools that are a fully adequate context for basic 
social education. The sharp institutionalisation of 
differences involved necessarily raises problems 
for education in the fundamental principles of a 
democratic society, something schools in a 
democracy must surely seek hard to preserve. 
Selection into classes on any particular basis 
similarly gives prominence to the distinction being 
made and it is once more hard to see how that can 
be justified unless it is necessary for overcoming 
learning difficulties. Basic social education like 
basic personal education is concerned with 
differences only as a hard practical necessity when 
empirical evidence justifies this. The evidence that 
it is necessary for education of these kinds is far 
from easy to find. 
But if there is little place, if any, for selection in 
either form of basic education, education for the 
fulfilment of personal abilities has very different 
implications. In pursuing this third purpose schools 
are seeking to pro.vide for each pupil opportunity to 
develop their own distinctive abilities at an 
appropriate level. The development of individual 
differences is of the essence of the business. What 
is wanted is the opportunity for pupils to go in 
different directions be they academic, technical, 
artistic or athletic and at their own pace. For this 
purpose it would seem that schools providing 
different opportunities are what we need and within 
them groupings of pupils based on ability in 
different areas that will allow the gifted to forge 
ahead at their own rate. This sounds like a 
"selective" and "streamed" arrangement. But 
though something of that sort is certainly indicated 
we must be careful about the details. To begin with, 
though we may want a differentiated system, that is 
not to say it must be a selective system. Choice of 
school by pupils rather than their allocation to 
schools might be more appropriate. Who does the 
selecting, the pupil or the school, makes a lot of 
difference. However, if there are to be only limited 
opportunities for developing certain abilities there 
might well need to be selection for access to 
particular areas of education. Even if that is so, 
however, do we really want separate institutions 
serving say academic and technical abilities? Is it 
not the case that any one pupil may wish to 
develop a combination of academic and technical 
abilities and that we might wish to encourage such 
combinations? Indeed, if personal fulfilment is a 
major purpose, to prevent combinations of abilities 
across the whole range is a serious disadvantage in 
any system. What is more, if the distinctive abilities 
of each pupil are to be valued as equally important 
for th~m personally and as· a contribution to 
society's good, the isolation of pupils into, say, 
academic and trades schools will do little to 
forward any real appreciation of the value of 
different abilities for society as a whole. It is also the 
case that in the early stages of education even for 
this third purpose the differences between 
individuals are not likely to be so great that 
5 
6 
separate institutions are needed for meeting pupils' 
needs. Within anv one school of reasonable size it 
is going to be possible to cope with very wide 
ranging abilities for pupils from say 11 to 16 by using 
setting and streaming. Clearly what can be done in 
any institution depends on its overall size and the 
age range for which it caters. The third purpose of 
education thus demands that schooling be 
progressively differentiated in ability terms, but 
that does not necessarily point to a selective 
system. It certainly points to ability grouping 
wherever that is necessary for high achievement, 
though setting for specific areas rather than 
streaming would be the ideal. 
The fourth purpose of education, that for 
personal rewards, is clearly like the third purpose, 
linked to differentiation within the educational 
system. If a high premium is put on developing the 
rewarded abilities, if only because the rewards of 
those who get to the top are so manifest, there will 
inevitably become great competitive pressure for 
the training of those abilities. In so far as such 
training is limited, that competition will be 
accentuated. It is the significance of extrinsic 
rewards and the competitive nature of access to 
them that produces popular demand for selective 
schools and patterns of setting and streaming. In 
most modern societies the rewards attached to 
specific· 'jobs means that at school level the 
development of academic abilities is the key and it 
is therefore not surprising that a selective system 
dominated by academic pursuits has emerged. 
Clearly in these contexts that serves well the 
pursuit of rewards and, provided the competition is 
run on the grounds of ability only so as not to 
infringe our commitments to equality of 
opportunity, where can be the objection? In so far 
as schools serve this fourth purpose only, there is, I 
suggest, no answer to that question. 
But in so far as schools serve all the four 
purposes I have outlined, conflicts emerge that we 
must take seriously. Even where the pursuit of 
personal abilities is concerned there is a genuine 
tension between the third and fourth purposes I 
have distinguished. As I indicated earlier, concern 
for rewards and the competition that that involves 
can deflect education away from the importance of 
developing pupils' abilities for their personal 
significance in themselves and their value in society 
irrespective of the rewards. Being a first rate 
plumber can for some be personally more fulfilling 
than being a lawyer even if the rewards are much 
lower. What is more both jobs are vital in our 
society. If my third educational purpose is to be 
reconciled with the fourth, the institutionalisation 
of competitive academic selection will need to be 
moderated by explicit concern for other values. If 
not we will build into the very structure of our 
institutions a distorted concern for abilities which 
fails to develop them as providing personal 
fulfilment and as important contributions to 
society. That would be a great disservice to our 
pupils individually and be a negative force in our 
society. 
There is, however, a yet greater tension 
between the demands of the two forms of basic 
education outlined and the two forms of education 
directed to 13ach individual's personal abilities. 
Basic personal and social education are in aim 
essentially non-differentiating, whereas concern 
for the individual's personal abilities must be 
differentiating. If therefore we wish to do justice to 
both of these major concerns we must somehow 
organise our · educational system to combine 
elements of differentiation, including selection, 
with elements of non-differentiation. As in all moral 
and social problems where there are conflicting 
aims we must seek a way ahead that provides an 
acceptable compromise within our context. How 
are we to find that? 
In the United Kingdom we had for many years a 
supposedly tripartite system of secondary 
education which at 11+ selected pupils into 
secondary grammar, secondary technical and 
secondary modern schools in a roughly descending 
order of intellectual ability as assessed by 
combining I.Q. tests with tests in mathematics and 
English. Primary schools, for pupils from 5 to 11+, 
were local comprehensive schools taking pupils of 
all abilities, though their later years were streamed, 
or more rarely were setted separately for 
mathematics and English. This sytem, though 
officially presented as concerned with the third of 
my four educational purposes, was in practice seen 
by many people as dominated by the fourth 
purpose, the provision for a selected minority of an 
education that could bring greater extrinsic 
rewards. It was in fact objected to by many because 
the selection procedures were inaccurate, though 
it was the best that could be devised. It was 
considered too rigid, too decisive in its 
consequences, too self-fulfilling in depressing the 
development of the less able and so on. But in 
terms of my earlier analysis it had more 
fundamental weaknesses if schools ought to take 
seriously all four educational purposes I have 
outlined. First it took a minimalist view of the basic 
personal education needed by all pupils. It saw this 
as the concern of the very early years of primary 
education only, after that the promotion of 
individual personal abilities for fulfilment and 
reward became the point. But in fact the modern 
world has long demanded basic knowledge, 
understanding and skills of a considerable range 
and sophistication. The basic general education 
about the world we live in that all people need 
nowadays is simply not provided by schooling 
dominated by academic pursuits from an early 
stage. My own view is that we can no fonger really 
justify any pupils abandoning basic education even 
for part of the curriculum before, say, 14. It takes 
until then for most pupils to begin to master the 
kind of knowledge of our contemporary physical 
and social context required for living in it 
intelligently and competently. At present most _of 
us, dependent on our own initiatives and the media, 
never even attain that by middle age. But our 
traditional "selective" and "streamed" system 
equally took a minimalist view of the basic social 
education that all pupils need. In particular it 
prepared pupils hardly at all for the choices and 
responsibilities they faced. In any complex liberal 
democracy these choices and responsibilities are 
now very considerable. Increases in personal 
freedom have in most societies come with the 
disappearance of many of the forces that 
previously held society together. Increas~ngly 
democratic societies now depend on the d1rect 
voluntary adherence of all their members of certain 
crucial fundamental principles. The significance of 
schools as institutions where these principles of 
equality, freedom and respect for others a~e both 
truly expressed and adequately taught. IS n~w 
overwhelming. It seems to me that basic soCial 
education until 14 is required. In the light of these 
comments on both forms of basic education and 
what they entail, I can see no real justification for 
any form of selective schools in U.K. until about 14. 
Inside schools for pupils up to about 14 the 
separation of p~pils into special groups for certain 
remedial purposes can clearly be justified but 
otherwise all groupings, I suggest, should be 
expressly comprehensive or, where appropriate, 
simply on the basis of pupil choice. 
But if the traditional U.K. selective system 
minimalised basic personal and social education, it 
also served to narrow education for personal 
fulfilment quite unacceptably. By institutional 
groupings into three kinds of schools it prevented 
the development of combinations of abilities that 
we now regard as not only natural but personally 
desirable and socially important. Early selection 
and streaming prevented many from the later 
pursuit of abilities by restricting far too soon and far 
too narrowly the choices open to pupils. The status 
of the academic education provided in grammar 
schools, because of its leading to external rewards, 
only served to accentuate the pursuit of a narrow 
range of abilities particularly by the academically 
able. But it led too to a valuing of abilities primarily 
for the extrinsic rewards they bring rather than for 
their personal and social significance. A selective 
system within a capitalist economy cannot but 
accentuate extrinsic rather than intrinsic 
educational values with the personal and social 
consequences so narrow a view entails. The more 
we let selection rip the greater is the pressure on 
individuals to pursue what is rewarded rather than 
what will bring personal satisfaction or social good. 
The greater too is the tendency to undervalue the 
contribution of non-academic abilities in society 
with the undemocratic sentiments that that entails. 
In keeping with these comments on the 
significance of the former selective system in U.K. 
for the development of personal abilities, I would 
defend most firmly the U.K.'s almost universal 
move to a comprehensive school system for pupils 
from 5 up to at least 16. Within that, the fulfilment of 
personal abilities requires as flexible arrangements 
as possible for personal choice amongst groups 
appropriate to one's individual capacities. 
Exercising this function in most areas at any 
advanced stage will require setting by ability. But 
the institutional framework for those groups 
should be as wide ranging as makes practical sense 
and in the U.K. I consider secondary schools 
should therefore be comprehensive. Ideally I think 
the U.K. should push ahead with comprehensive 
institutions for all up to 18. After that some 
differentiation into academic, technical and other 
institutions geared to different kinds of specialist 
abilities seems to me inevitable. Within our primary 
and secondary comprehensive schools I would 
want a system of class groupings that is as mixed as 
possible in ability and all other respects up to about 
14, as the sole emphasis of education to that age I 
take to be basic education. Remedial education 
would be available as also might be special interest 
groups which pupils would choose. From 14, 
however, though some basic education should I 
think continue until 16 in mixed ability groups, 
education for personal abilities could be phased in 
during the period 14 to 16. For this purpose part of 
the time-table, say half, might be directly devoted 
to developing individual abilities in core areas such 
as languages, mathematics and science. Here 
pupils could be grouped according to ability as is 
appropriate. Streaming I see as an adequate but 
not very desirable crude approximation to setting. 
Even in these setted groups, however, I would 
want to work up to 16 to concentrate on general 
educational purposes rather than those of narrow 
academic specialisation. Only from 16 at the 
earliest would I wish education to be given over 
entirely to a concern for personal abilities with 
pupils setted on appropriate academic or other 
ability grounds. 
Such a system may or may not be what is 
required in the Maltese context. That is for others 
to judge. But forcing the issues to a practical level 
for the U.K. context will have served I ho'pe to 
highlight the major decisions of principle which any 
contemporary educational system including your 
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own must face. Using the framework of the four 
educational purposes I have outlined, I suggest the 
following questions need to be addressed: 
(a) How extensive do we consider basic personal 
and social education should be for all, for during the 
years we wish to pursue that as the dominant 
purpose I suggest we must be committed to a 
fundamentally non-selective and non-streamed 
school system? 
(b) How important do we consider the 
development of abilities for the sake of personal 
fulfilment and social good, for that requires classes 
differentiated according to different abilities and 
standards for those? In particular from what age 
should classes devoted to this purpose be 
introduced into schools? 
(c) How important are freedom of choice and 
equality of status in the development of abilities, for 
these suggest a non-differentiated school system 
with differentiated rather than selective classes 
within each school? 
(d) What restrictions are to be placed on the 
development of certain valued abilities because of 
the costs involved and the social significance of 
those abilities, for to the extent we introduce 
restrictions equally of opportunity means that 
selection becomes necessary? In general, 
restrictions must surely be undesirable as being 
contrary to human freedom but they are necessary 
in all societies for the greater social good and longer 
term interests of individuals. Selection into classes 
within a comprehensive school system can 
probably provide an adequate degree of selection 
in most economically advanced societies. Only if a 
very high level of selection is judged necessary or 
desirable would a selective school system seem 
justifiable. 
(e) How important do we consider it that schools 
educate pupils to compete for the restricted pool of 
extrinsic rewards, for to the extent we value this we 
will directly advocate an appropriate and efficient 
selective school system and sets or streaming 
Notes 
1. In this paper I have indicated that I consider that a school 
system ought not to be selective on religious or social 
(including financial) grounds. I take that position as basic to 
the role of the school in an open democracy. This is not to say 
that in my view schools have no role in relation to religious 
education or that they may not charge fees (e.g. say, in some 
way related to parental income). If religious or finandal 
selection is advocated this must rest on other educational or 
social purposes which may well conflict with the four 
purposes that I have outlined, particularly that of basic social 
education for all. This is not the place for arguing against such 
other purposes in an open democracy. In the last analysis, 
however, whether any such principles are to be accepted and 
what weight they are to be given are again matters for proper 
democratic decision in a society. But it that is accepted it 
within those schools? ·If rewards are not freely 
available, freedom and equality in pursuit of these 
become restricted to the opportunity to compete 
against others on wharare considered equal terms. 
Over all, it seems to me that in a democratic 
society committed to freedom and equality of 
educational opportunity the extent and nature of 
selection in a school system reflects two major 
concerns. First, the society's restrictions for 
whatever reasons, good or bad, on the develop-
ment of certain abilities and, secondly, how far 
education for extrinsic rewards is allowed to 
dominate other educational purposes. It is to me 
unremarkable that the USA has the most non-
selective educational system in the world. First, the 
society, as the most open democracy there is, 
strongly committed to freedom and equality, sets a 
high premium on basic personal and social 
education for all. Secondly, as a rich society it has 
little or no need to restrict opportunities for the 
development of personal abilities. Thirdly, rewards 
in American society are more widely distributed 
than in many others and are less directly related to 
a restricted form of education. In the U.K. we have 
until recently been moving more in the American 
direction. Unfortunately, to my mind, a spell of 
economic difficulty and a shift in public values has 
resurrected an unnecessary concern for individual 
extrinsic rewards and competition within the 
educational system. But I do not wish to give the 
impression that a school system can successfully 
operate without coherent alignment with the 
economy of the society it serves. If that society is a 
liberal democracy, however, it must wish its 
schools to balance those concerns with its 
commitment to the fundamental values of 
democracy. Every such society must therefore I 
suggest consciously form its own resolution of the 
demands made by the four educational purposes I 
have outlined. And it must do that in a thoroughly 
democratic fashion. 
must be recognised that the concerns of democracy rather 
than those of any particular group within it, be that the 
church or the affluent, are being given the ultimate right to 
decide on matters for society as a whole. In fact that is 
precisely how I think such matters should be settled. 
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